The SOE reform in China/周大勇

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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

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  概要:死亡赔偿金可否用于偿还死者生前的债务?死亡赔偿金在权利人之间应如何分配?这是在司法实践中常常会遇到的问题,对于该问题的处理,有不同的观点。有人认为《继承法》规定的遗产是死者死亡时留下的财产,死亡赔偿金是赔给生存的近亲属的,不属于遗产,不能用于判决偿还死者生前的债务;有人认为人身损害赔偿理论将其定性为继承损失说,死亡赔偿金是对死者未来余命年龄可得利益的减少而给与的补偿,说明其具有遗产性质,应视为死者的遗产,予以判决。两种意见分歧的根源在于法律对死亡赔偿金性质的规定不明确。笔者拟通过对死亡赔偿金的性质、当前在理论上的分歧、审判实践中的做法的考察,对死亡赔偿金的性质及如何合理分配做一些分析探讨,以期规范该类案件的审理。


  一、问题的提出

  笔者近期审理过这样两个案子:例1:徐某与石某驾驶机动车发生交通事故,致使徐某重伤和石某死亡,交警部门认定徐某承担事故次要责任,石某承担事故主要责任。石某近亲属诉至法院徐某及保险公司,法院审理后判决保险公司赔偿15万多,徐某赔偿2万多。现徐某诉至法院要求石某近亲属赔偿,就前案判决的死亡赔偿金能否用于偿还死者生前债务?产生了两种意见,一种意见认为,《继承法》规定的遗产是死者死亡时留下的财产,死亡赔偿金是赔给生存的继承人的,不属于遗产,不能用于偿还死者生前的债务,不该判决;另一种意见认为,死亡赔偿金是对死者未来余命年龄可得利益的减少而给予的补偿。人身损害赔偿理论将其定性为继承损失说,说明其具有遗产性质,应视为死者的遗产,可以用于偿还其生前债务,予以判决。

  例2:在一起共有纠纷中,受害人死亡后获得了加害方的经济赔偿,受害人父母占用了该部分赔偿款,受害人妻子及女儿诉至法院要求平均分割该部分赔偿款中的死亡赔偿金,该死亡赔偿金在受害人近亲属之间应如何分配?

  对上述纠纷如何处理,法律及司法解释未明确规定,各地司法实践中处理不统一,原因在于法律对死亡赔偿金性质的规定不明确,各地理解做法不一致,影响了法律效果和社会效果。于是,引出笔者对死亡赔偿金性质的思考。

  二、死亡赔偿金制度的渊源演变及理论学说

  (一)我国法律规范中关于死亡赔偿金制度的沿革演变

  1、最早涉及对死者进行赔偿的是1963年4月28日最高人民法院作出《关于交通肇事抚恤问题的批复》同意了黑龙江高级法院:“只要不是被害人自己过失引起的死亡,不管被害人是否有劳动能力都应酌情给一点抚恤”。的意见。这就意味着,在交通肇事中的被害人无论是否有劳动能力,都要给予被害人家属抚恤。此种抚恤的性质,就不是抚养丧失的损失,也不是继承丧失的损失,而是为了安抚死者家属。

  2、民法通则第119条规定:“侵害公民身体造成伤害的应当赔偿医疗费因误工减少的收入残疾者生活补助费等费用;造成死亡的,并应当支付丧葬费,死者生前抚养的人必要的生活费等费用。”

  该条中虽然没有出现“死亡赔偿金”或类似的赔偿项目,但学者解释说,条文中“等费用”就包括了死亡赔偿金,至少为死亡赔偿金留下了可能的余地。

  3、1992年1月1日生效的《道路交通事故处理办法》第37条第(8)项规定,“死亡补偿费:按照交通事故发生地平均生活费计算,补偿十年。”这是立法文件中正式出现死亡补偿费的概念。该办法第37条第(9)项还规定了给付“被抚养人生活费”,《办法》将二者并列,说明此处的死亡补偿费侧重于对死者生前经受的痛苦的精神补偿和死者亲属的精神补偿。

  4、立法中正式出现死亡赔偿金的概念是1994年1月1日生效的《消费者权益保护法》。该法第42条规定,“经营者提供商品或服务,造成消费者或其他受害人死亡的,应当支付丧葬费、死亡赔偿金以及由死者生前抚养的人所必要的生活费等费用”。

  5、2001年3月10日起施行的最高法院《关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔偿责任若干问题的解释》第9条第(2)项规定,致人死亡的,精神损害抚慰金为死亡赔偿金。将死亡赔偿金定性为精神抚慰金,这实际上是对死亡赔偿金的简化,但将导致刑事附带民事诉讼中赔偿权利人得到的赔偿将会少得可怜,也不便协调死亡赔偿金与其他死亡赔偿项目的关系。

  6、2004年5月1日起施行的最高法院《关于审理人身损害赔偿若干问题的解释》第18条规定了精神抚慰金,第29条规定了死亡赔偿金,二者并列,说明该解释将死亡赔偿金再次定位为物质损害赔偿。

  (二)有关死亡赔偿金的理论学说

  1、“扶养丧失说”。该学说认为由于被侵权人死亡导致其生前依法定抚养义务供给生活费的被抚养人,丧失了生活费的供给来源,受有财产损害,对此损害加害人应当予以赔偿。在这种立法例下,赔偿义务人赔偿的范围,就是被抚养人在被侵权人生前从其收入中获得的或者有权获得的自己的抚养费的份额。至于因被侵权人的死亡而导致对被侵权人享有法定继承权的那些人从被侵权人处将来所继承财产减少的损失,不属于赔偿之列。另外在赔偿时,如果被侵权人没有受其供养的被扶养人,不存在损害,赔偿义务人就不承担该项赔偿责任。目前采取此种观点的有德国、英国、美国大多数州、俄罗斯等。

  2、“继承丧失说”。该学说认为侵害他人生命致人死亡,不仅生命利益本身受侵害,而且造成被侵权人余命年内的收入“逸失”,使得这些原本可以作为被侵权人的财产为其法定继承的未来可以取得收入,因加害人的侵害行为而丧失,对于这种损害应当予以赔偿。实际上,在这种立法下,赔偿义务人应当赔偿的范围为被侵权人死亡而丧失的未来可得利益。美国少数州、日本等采取该学说。

  在我国关于死亡赔偿金的性质上历来存在争议。《民法通则》第119条没有规定死亡赔偿金。《道路交通事故处理办法》第37条第一次出现死亡补偿费的概念,《消费者权益保护法》第42条、《国家赔偿法》第27条、《产品质量法》第44条对死亡赔偿金作了规定,其基本性质属于精神损害赔偿金。除《国家赔偿法》的规定外,实际上其他的规范所采纳的是“扶养丧失说”。

  但是以“扶养丧失说”作为我国死亡赔偿金制度的理论基础,存在不足,对赔偿权利人的保护不够周到,在司法实务中出现了困境,为此,《关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释》放弃过去的立场,而是以“继承丧失说”解释我国有关法律规定中的死亡赔偿金制度。按照这一新的解释立场,死亡赔偿金的内容是对收入损失的赔偿,其性质是财产损害赔偿,而不是精神损害赔偿。故我国死亡赔偿金的理论基础经历了从“扶养丧失说”到“继承丧失说”的变化。《侵权责任法》出台后,由于赔偿项目中未规定被扶养人生活费,有学者认为《侵权责任法》对死亡赔偿金采取的是“扶养丧失说”。但这种观点是不对的,最高人民法院在2010年6月30日下发了关于适用《中华人民共和国侵权责任法》若干问题的通知,该通知规定:“人民法院适用侵权责任法审理民事纠纷案件,如受害人有被抚养人的,应当依据《最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释》第二十八条的规定,将被抚养人生活费计入残疾赔偿金或死亡赔偿金。”在《侵权责任法》适用后的司法实践中,各地法院基本都是按照死亡赔偿金和被扶养人生活费同时支持的,故以“继承丧失说”解释我国目前的死亡赔偿金制度是科学合理的。

  三、死亡赔偿金与遗产的关系

  关于死亡赔偿金是否属于遗产,历年争议就很多,有学者认为死亡赔偿金不属于遗产,又有学者认为死亡赔偿金属于遗产,莫衷一是。司法实践中遇到类似案例,各地法院判决不一的情形也比比皆是。

  所谓遗产,《继承法》是以列举的方式规定的:遗产是公民死亡时遗留的个人合法财产,包括:(一)公民的收入;(二)公民的房屋、储蓄和生活用品;(三)公民的林木、牲畜和家禽;(四)公民的文物、图书资料;(五)法律允许公民所有的生产资料;(六)公民的著作权、专利权中的财产权利;(七)公民的其他合法财产。《继承法意见》又对“其他合法财产”作出了解释:公民可继承的其他合法财产包括有价证券和履行标的为财物的债权等。

  通常认为死亡赔偿金属于遗产的主要有以下学说:

  1、民事权利能力转化说,认为自然人的死亡,其民事权利能力由存在到不存在有一个转化的过程,在此过程中,产生了损害赔偿请求权。这种学说有一个无法解决的矛盾:被害人正处于死亡的过程中,则其应是还未死亡尚有生命的活人,一活人怎能取得因死亡而生的损害求偿权。

  2、加害人赔偿义务说,认为加害人因其行为所生的赔偿义务不因被害人死亡而消灭,故被害人的求偿权由其继承人继承。但在法律上没有无义务的权利,也没有无权利的义务,这种学说所提出的义务由于不存在对应的权利,因此根本就不存在。
  一、基本案情

  王某与李某长相颇为相似,同在A公司工作,且住单位同一宿舍。某日,王某趁李某不在宿舍之机,窃取李某的工商银行卡和身份证,至工行某支行自称是李某,称忘记银行卡密码,要修改密码,并提供李某的身份证。银行工作人员经审查,为其修改了密码,王某遂取款6000元。

  二、本案的法律适用

  我国《刑法》第196条第3款规定:盗窃信用卡并使用的,依照本法第264条的规定定罪处罚。根据全国人大常委会通过的《关于〈中华人民共和国刑法〉有关信用卡规定的解释》,刑法规定的信用卡,是指由商业银行或者其它金融机构发行的具有消费支付、信用贷款、转账结算、存取现金等全部功能或者部分功能的电子支付卡。

  依据现行刑法规定及司法实践,本案中王某的行为性质认定是比较清晰的。王某窃取李某的银行卡和身份证,至银行柜台冒充李某修改并取款6000元,属于盗窃信用卡并使用的行为,依据刑法第196条第3款及刑法第264条之规定,成立盗窃罪是显而易见的。

  三、本案引发的思考

  若对本案做进一步研究,会发现一些有趣的问题。刑法第196条规定了信用卡诈骗罪,其中第2款规定冒用信用卡的行为,第3款规定盗窃信用卡并使用的,依据盗窃罪定罪处罚。那么,刑法第196条的第2款与第3款之间是什么关系呢?

  刑法第196条第3款规定,盗窃他人信用卡并使用的,依据刑法第264条的规定处罚,即依据盗窃罪的规定处罚。因此,若盗窃他人信用卡并使用,刷卡消费或取款达到盗窃罪规定的数额较大,即以盗窃罪定罪处罚。需要说明的是,本条规定并非一种行为类型。此为法律的拟制性规定,将A种类型的行为以B种行为类型的规定定罪处罚。

  那么,需要思考的问题时,盗窃信用卡并使用的行为类型是什么。要解决这个问题,需要对“盗窃信用卡并使用”这一行为作具体的分析。我们认为,可以将该行为分解为两部分,其一,盗窃信用卡;其二,(盗窃后)使用信用卡。

  先谈谈盗窃信用卡的行为,因盗窃罪是财产型犯罪,而信用卡本身价值极小,因此,盗窃信用卡后若无其他行为,则不能认为被害人财产权受到侵犯,行为人的行为不能认定为盗窃罪,因此,盗窃信用卡行为本身在刑法上是不成立盗窃罪的。

  再看使用信用卡的行为性质,我国刑法第196条规定了信用卡诈骗罪,其中一种行为类型为冒用他人信用看,行为人冒充他人使用他人信用卡进行刷卡消费、取款等行为,为冒用他人信用卡的行为,此为刑法196条第1款规制的内容。

  综上,盗窃信用卡的行为是盗窃行为与冒用他人信用卡的行为的叠加。那么,在均达到犯罪数额的情况下,盗窃信用卡并使用的行为包含了冒用他人信用卡的行为,可以认为,此处出现了法条内“条款竞合”的情况。因此,在司法实践中,对于能够认定为盗窃他人信用卡并使用的,应成立盗窃罪,若对于信用卡的来源不能证实,即不能认定盗窃信用卡的事实,则可以对使用他人信用卡的行为单独予以评价,认定为冒用他人信用卡的行为,成立信用卡诈骗罪。

  进一步研究会发现,不仅是盗窃后冒用他人信用卡成立盗窃罪,盗窃并使用作废的信用卡、盗窃并使用伪造的信用卡以及盗窃并恶意透支的,均成立盗窃罪。

  刑法第196条列举了使用伪造的信用卡、使用作废的信用卡、冒用他人信用卡的以及恶意透支这四种信用卡诈骗的情形,接着规定了盗窃信用卡并使用的,依照刑法第264条的规定处罚,即以盗窃罪定罪处罚。

  我们认为,刑法第196条规定的四种信用卡诈骗的类型,实质上也是信用卡常见的使用类型,此处的“使用”即包含合法的使用,也含非法的使用,使用的对象即有合法有效的信用卡,也有伪造、变造的信用卡,限于篇幅,不再具体论证。

  因此,刑法第196条第3款规定的“盗窃信用卡并使用的”中的“使用”行为一般应包括使用伪造的信用卡、使用作废的信用卡、冒用他人信用卡、恶意透支四种常见行为。

  作者单位:安徽省六安市裕安区人民检察院